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Rates of Return to Public Agricultural Research in 48 U.S. States.

Abstract
The internal rate of return (IRR) to public investment in agricultural R&D
is estimated for each of the continental U.S. states. Theoretically, our contribution
provides a way of obtaining the returns to a local public good using Rothbart’s concept of
virtual prices. Empirically, we use the spatial dependency among states generated by
knowledge spillovers to define the ‘appropriate’ jurisdiction. We estimate an average
own-state rate of 17% and a social rate of 29%. These figures should inform the policy
debate on the allocation of federal funds to research in the actual food crisis environment.

1. Introduction
President Bush's proposed budget for fiscal year 2009 intends to boost federal
investments in physical sciences through increased funding for research and development
(R&D) at the Department of Energy's Office of Science, the National Science
Foundation, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology's intramural
program. However, the increased support for R&D in physical sciences comes at the
expense of reduced funding for other agencies, namely the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Department of Veteran Affairs, the Department of Interior’s US Geological
Survey agency, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Accounting for
congressional earmarks in 2008, the USDA would see its R&D funding fall by 16% to
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$2.0 billion. 3 In particular, funding for research and education activities under the
Cooperative State, Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES) would decline
by 20%; and the federal science and technology budgets for the Agricultural Research
Service and the Forest Research Service would decline, respectively, by 7.5% and 8%
(American Association for the Advancement of Science 2008).
This reduced support to agricultural research will have an impact on the
productivity of the agricultural sector. The magnitude of the impact and its timing is
debatable. The importance of this issue is highlighted by the international food crisis
generated by high agricultural commodities prices due in big part to their use in biofuel
generation. It is as a result of this crisis that a re-examination of international
investments in public agricultural R&D during the last forty years has revealed a decrease
in support even when returns of Green Revolution technology had been high, playing an
important part in today’s food crisis.
The present study intends to contribute to the debate by providing an assessment
of the benefits from public investment in agricultural R&D for each continental U.S.
state, acknowledging in theory and empirics their local public goods nature. This is the
first study to endogenously recover the impact of public investments in agricultural R&D
for each of the 48 continental U.S. states while accounting for structural and stochastic
dependency among the states due to knowledge spillovers. 4 The assessment is conducted
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The President’s proposed cut is due to the elimination of earmarked funds that are likely to be reinstated
by Congress. The House and Senate versions of the federal budget (as of June 20, 2008) would result,
respectively, in an estimated 8% and 9% decrease in agricultural R&D with respect to fiscal year 2008
(excluding earmarked funds).
4
Khanna, Huffman and Sandler (1994) analyzed the optimal allocation of public monies to agricultural
R&D in the same 48 U.S. states considered in the present study with a joint production model of public and
state-specific benefits. Spillovers were defined as contemporary expenditures in R&D in neighboring
states, and state expenditures in R&D were endogenous to their problem. Given that the focus of the
present study is on the impact of the stock of knowledge generated by public R&D on the cost structure of
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in terms of the Internal Rate of Return 5 (IRR): the greater is the IRR, ceteris paribus, the
more socially desirable it is to invest in public agricultural R&D. Any responsible policy
discussion about the disposition of public funds should be based on knowledge of the
private and social returns to such investment. We provide the estimates of the IRR to
public investments in agricultural R&D for each U.S. state hoping in this way to
contribute to the policy debate
In addition to the policy contribution, we contribute to the literature by providing
a general theory and a way of measuring the returns to a local public good using the
concept of virtual prices.6 In assessing the benefits of public agricultural R&D, it is
crucial to recognize its local public goods nature. Since there is no market for trading
public goods, no market assessment of the value of public goods is readily available, and
their value must be recovered endogenously. In addition, a local public good needs a
definition of its ‘appropriate’ jurisdiction. While some research results are fully usable
only by the jurisdiction that incurred the costs of R&D some are also usable by other
jurisdictions, giving rise to knowledge spillovers. Therefore, the major challenges for the
researcher are: to estimate the returns to this public good and to do so by attributing the
benefits from an investment in R&D to the ‘appropriate’ jurisdiction. Latimer and
Paarlberg (1965) and Evenson (1967) have early indicated the potential distortion in the
estimates of the contribution of public R&D to the agricultural sector due to the presence

the agricultural sector, and the fact that the stock of public R&D is constructed as a weighted average of
past expenditures in R&D, public expenditures are exogenous to our model and spillovers are defined in
terms of stocks of knowledge generated in neighboring states.
5
The IRR is the rate of return that equals the discounted stream of benefits from an investment with its
initial cost.
6
A virtual price, introduced originally in demand theory by Rothbart (1941), is the price at which the
consumer/producer, acting as a price taker, will choose to consume a specified bundle.
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of spillovers. 7 It is in this sense that the researcher must define the jurisdiction under
analysis. In this study, the benefits from an investment in R&D are estimated from the
impacts of such investments on the production structure for two different levels of
aggregation: the state where the investment was undertaken (the own state benefits), and
the state and its geographical neighbors (the social benefits). 8
The researcher then must address the problems in estimation of the benefits of
R&D, not only for the own state, but for all other states affected by the existence of
spillover effects across them. Most of the studies on the effects of R&D are ad-hoc. They
include primal and dual approaches in which a variable representing the stock of own
state R&D variable is included in a production function, cost function or on a two step
regression of a productivity index to capture the own state benefits. Some studies add an
ad-hoc spill-in variable to capture the social benefits and to avoid the structural
dependence problem among states due to the local public goods nature of the investment.
But it is possible that knowledge generated in one state might benefit other states beyond
the geographical limits imposed ad-hoc by researchers when defining the spill-in stocks.
If this is the case, the residuals of the estimating model will contain relevant information
and will be correlated among geographical units, generating cross-sectional stochastic
dependence. One potential effect of ignoring such information, mentioned in Alston and
Pardey (2001), is that “improper attribution of locational spillovers generates high and
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White and Havlicek (1979) showed that failure to take into account geographical spillovers from U.S.
regional agricultural research inflated the estimated rate of return to R&D in the Southern region by more
than 25 percent. For a review of the economic impacts of agricultural R&D at sectoral and aggregate levels
both for the U.S. and other countries, see Evenson (2001), Alston et al (2000), and Alston (2002).
8
Huffman, Gopinath and Somwaru (2002) estimated the own state IRR to public expenditures in
agricultural R&D for the “representative” Midwestern state to be 11% per annum, and a social rate of
return of 43% per annum. Yee et al (2002) estimated the social rate of return to public agricultural research
to be about 3.5 to 6.7 times the own state rate of return for the “representative” state in each of the seven
regions defined in their study.
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very variable estimates of the rate of return to agricultural research.” In this study we will
also explore this hypothesis by estimating these returns endogenously with information
on spillover effects incorporated structural and stochastically.
Theoretically, aggregate technology is represented by a variable cost function.
The own-state stock of public R&D enters the variable cost as a fixed input of
production. A spill-in variable is explicitly incorporated into the model to account for
structural dependency among neighboring states. The virtual prices for the own-state of
public R&D and the spill-in variables are endogenous to this problem and are recovered
from the cost function following Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) and Onofri and Fulginiti
(2008). Measurement of these concepts is done econometrically by constructing and
explicitly incorporating variables representing own state and spill-in stocks of R&D in
the structure of the model. Parameters of such a model are then used in the calculation of
IRR’s. These IRR’s then will include own state plus spill-in impacts of the R&D
investment. The existence of stochastic spatial dependency and the extent of its
propagation across states are tested with the Keleijian and Robinson (1992) test. The
model with spatial autocorrelation (SAR) in the error structure is estimated with U.S.
state-level annual data for the period 1949-1991 (Craig, Pardey and Acquaye, 2002)
using generalized spatial three stage least squares (Keleijian and Prucha 2004). The
resulting estimates from the spatial model are compared to the estimates from a nonspatial model to assess the impact of stochastic spatial dependency on estimated IRRs.
We expect that failing to correct for stochastic spatial dependency induced by knowledge
spillovers would affect the definition of the appropriate jurisdiction and the magnitude of
returns to R&D.

5

The estimates of the IRR to public agricultural R&D are positive and significant
for all states. The average own state IRR for the nation is estimated, in the spatial model,
at 17%, while the average social IRR is estimated at 29%. In the non-spatial model these
estimates are 12% and 14% higher, respectively. Distributions of estimates in both
models for all states are available. The returns estimated are very impressive, 9 even
though correcting for stochastic spill-ins in public agricultural research has resulted in
lower IRR’s estimates than the few others found in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the economic model used to
capture the virtual prices of a local public good is presented. It is shown then how these
virtual prices are incorporated into the calculation of the own state and the social IRR’s
and how the ‘appropriate jurisdictions’ are determined. The data used and the estimation
procedure are described next, followed by a description of the results. A summary of the
findings and their relevance is provided in the concluding section.

2. The Model
The unit of analysis, determined by the level of aggregation of the available data,
is the state. We assume that each state produces an aggregate output, y, using variable
inputs x = x1 ,… , x N , fixed private inputs v = v1 , … , v M , and fixed public inputs

V = V1 ,…, VQ . The vector of prices of the variable inputs is denoted by w = w1 , …, wN ,
N

with w ⋅ x = ∑ wn x n . Let y = f ( x, v, V ) be the production function satisfying
n =1

9

During the same period, the average returns of the S&P500 was 9% and that of the NASDAQ composite
index was 12%.
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monotonicity and weak essentiality in x. Let B ( y , v, V ) = {x : f ( x, v, V ) ≥ y} be the closed,
non-empty and convex restricted input requirement set to produce output y. Then, a welldefined non-negative short-run variable cost function c (w, y , v, V ) exists which is nondecreasing, concave, continuous and positively linearly homogeneous in w, and nondecreasing in y (Chambers 1988):
(1) c(w, y, v, V ) = min{w ⋅ x : x ∈ B( y, v,V )}
x≥0

Furthermore, if c (w, y , v, V ) is differentiable in w, it also satisfies Shephard’s lemma in w:
(2) x = ∇ w c(w, y, v, V )
where x is the vector of cost-minimizing variable input demands, homogeneous of degree
zero in w and with symmetric and negative semi-definite matrix ∇ w x = ∇ ww c(w, y, v, V ) .
If c (w, y , v, V ) is differentiable in v and V, Shephard’s lemma can be applied to fixed
factors. For convenience, c (w, y , v, V ) is assumed twice continuously differentiable in all
its arguments. The monetary value placed by producers on marginal units of private fixed
factors v, hereon referred to as the shadow value or virtual price Zv, is represented by the
amount of variable cost saved in the production of y due to the availability of an extra
unit of v:
(3) Z v = −∇ v c(w, y, v, V )
In the short-run, Zv can be positive or negative, depending on the level of the private
fixed factor with respect to its long-run optimum and on its disposability assumption. If
the level of private fixed factor is below its long-run optimum, the variable cost function
is expected to be decreasing in v (i.e., Z v > 0 ) since the set of feasible combinations of
(x, v, V) increases when an extra unit of v is available for production, so that new cost-
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minimizing opportunities (previously unavailable) are opened up (Chambers 1988, p.
102). 10 If the private fixed factor is above its long-run optimum and it is freely disposable
(i.e., it does not cost anything in terms of output or other inputs to get rid of the extra
units above the optimal level), then the variable cost function is expected to be
independent of v (i.e., Z v = 0 ). However, if the private fixed factor is above its long-run
optimum but it is not freely disposable (i.e., it is costly to dispose off the extra units), its
shadow value is expected to take a negative sign (i.e., Z v < 0 ), indicating that an extra
unit of the private fixed factor might actually increase short-run variable costs. Since we
make no a priori assumption about the free disposability of private fixed inputs or their
level with respect to their long-run optimum, we do not expect any particular sign for Z v .
The monetary value placed by producers on marginal units of public factors V,
hereon referred to as the shadow value or virtual price ZV, is represented by the amount of
variable cost saved in the production of y due to the availability of an extra unit of V:
(4) Z V = −∇V c(w, y, v,V )
Similar to the shadow values of private fixed factors, the shadow values of public factors
can be positive or negative, depending on their free disposability. While some public
inputs might be freely disposable, (e.g. public roads that producers might choose not to
use), some others are not (e.g. pollution). Since we make no a priori assumption about the
free disposability of public inputs, we do not expect any particular sign for ZV . If
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In primal space, Z v ≥ 0 implies that the marginal product of an extra unit of the private fixed factor v is

positive when the marginal cost of producing an extra unit of output is positive; i.e.,

Zv = − ∂

*

(

∂v = ∂

*

)

∂y (∂y ∂v ) ≥ 0 ⇔ (∂y ∂v ) ≥ 0 ; where

(

corresponding to equation (1) evaluated at the optimal x values, ∂

*

*

is the Lagrange function

∂y ) is the reciprocal marginal cost of

an extra unit of output, and (∂y ∂v ) is the marginal product of the private fixed factor v.
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ZV ≥ 0 , an extra unit of the public factor generates short-run savings to agricultural
producers; while if Z V < 0 it might actually increase short-run variable costs. 11
Local public goods are provided to satisfy the needs of a certain group of
economic agents in a specific jurisdiction. In particular, local public knowledge on
agricultural sciences generated for a specific state i, Gi, is developed to satisfy the needs
of producers in that state. Therefore, it is completely usable by local producers and is
incorporated as a public fixed input of production in the present model. However, that
same knowledge might also be used by producers in other states after some adjustments
to (different) local conditions. The stock of knowledge spill-outs from state i to state j
(i ≠ j), Sji, is the share of the stock of knowledge generated in state i, Gi, usable by
producers in state j:
(5) S ji = α ji Gi ,
where αji represents the degree of usability of knowledge from state i in state j, and 0≤
αji<1. Therefore, the aggregate stock of spill-ins from neighboring states (indexed by j) to
state i is defined as:
(6) S i = ∑ S ij = ∑ α ij G j ,
j ≠i

j ≠i

and the vector of the stocks of public fixed inputs available to producers in state i is:
(7) V’={Gi, Si}.
The shadow value of the own state stock of public R&D in state i, ZGi, can now be
expressed as:

11

Since the second order gradients of the variable cost with respect to private and public fixed inputs
( ∇ vv c(⋅) , ∇ vV c (⋅ ) and ∇VV c(⋅) )characterize the rate of change of their shadow values, and no assumption
was made on the sign of their shadow values, no assumption is made on the rates of change.
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(8) Z Gi = −∇ Gi c(w, y, v, Gi , S i ) ,
and the shadow value of the stock of public R&D from a neighboring state j, ZSij, as:
(9) Z Sij = −∇ Gj c(w, y, v, Gi , S i ) = −α ij ∇ Si c(w, y, v, Gi , S i ) ,
where the second equality holds by construction of the stock of knowledge spill-outs
from state j to state i (equation 5). These two concepts, obtained from the theoretical
model, are used below in the calculation of the own state and the social IRR’s of public
investments.
The internal rate of return to public outlays in agricultural R&D is the discount
rate that makes the discounted stream of benefits during m periods stemming from an
increase in public investments in R&D in a given state i at time t0, equal to its initial cost.
The initial cost is the extra investment in time t0, conventionally represented in discrete
terms in the corporate finance literature as a negative amount, ΔRi, t0 < 0 . In the present
analysis, the stream of benefits for the state that conducted the R&D activities, state i, are
the reductions in the cost of agricultural production in successive periods ( − Δci ,t )
derived from the increased stock of publicly available knowledge ( ΔGi ,t ) generated by
the investment in R&D in t0. Therefore, the own state internal rate of return is the rate r
that solves the following program:
m

(10) 0 = ΔRi ,t0 − ∑
q =1

Δc i , t 0 + q ΔG i , t 0 + q

ΔGi ,t0 + q (1 + r )q

Note that − Δci ,t ΔG i ,t corresponds to the concept of ZGi, as defined in equation
(8). Therefore, equation (10) can be re-expressed as:
m

(11) 0 = ΔRi ,t0 + ∑ Z Gi ,t0 + q
q =1

ΔGi ,t0 + q

(1 + r )q

10

and a necessary condition for r to exist is that the shadow value of Gi be positive for at
least one period, i.e., Z Gi ,t0 + q >0 for some q >0. However, as long as the knowledge
generated by one state i is free and usable by producers in other j states, the concept of
total benefits from an increase in public investments in R&D in state i at time t0 might be
expanded to also include the spillovers of that investment, i.e. the reductions in the cost
of agricultural production in the other j states. The social internal rate of return is the rate
r1 that solves the following program:
m

(12) 0 = ΔRi ,t0 − ∑
q =1

Note that −

Δc i , t 0 + q ΔG i , t 0 + q

ΔGi ,t0 + q (1 + r1 )

Δc j ,t ΔS j ,t
ΔS j ,t ΔGi ,t

q

m

− ∑∑
j ≠ i q =1

Δc j , t 0 + q ΔS j , t 0 + q ΔG i , t 0 + q

ΔS j ,t0 + q ΔGi ,t0 + q (1 + r1 )q

corresponds to the concept of the shadow value to state j of an

increase in the stock of knowledge in state i, ZSji as defined in equation (9). Equation (12)
can be re-expressed in terms of virtual prices as:
m

(13) 0 = ΔRi ,t0 + ∑ Z Gi ,to + q
q =1

ΔGi ,to + q

(1 + r1 )q

m

+ ∑∑ Z Sji ,to + q
j ≠ i q =1

ΔGk ,to + q

(1 + r1 )q

The variable Gi is constructed as a weighted sum of previous expenditures in
public agricultural R&D in state i ( Ri ), with the weights following an inverted Vpattern. 12
U

(14) Gi ,t = ∑ϖ t − a Ri ,t − a
a =1

Given that the αij’s are not observable, the variable Si is constructed as the direct
sum of the stocks of Gj’s conducted in other states ( j ≠ i ): 13

12
13

A complete description on construction of Gi is given in the following section.
A complete description of Si is given in the following section.
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(15) S i ,t = ∑ G j ,t
j ≠i

and the imperfect usability nature of knowledge generated in other states is incorporated
structurally into the analysis through interaction terms in the variable cost chosen. The
following translog cost function is hypothesized to be stable over the period 1949-1991:
ln ci =

(16)

48

∑ ∑δ

n = M , L , K j =1

+

n, j

ln wn ,i DUM j +

∑δ

h = y ,T ,G

h

ln hi +

∑ ∑β

n = M , L , K h = y ,T ,G

nh

ln wn ,i ln hi

1
1
β nm ln wn ,i ln wm ,i +
∑
∑
∑ ∑ β hk ln hi ln k i
2 n= M , L, K m= M , L,K
2 h = y ,T ,G k = y ,T ,G

⎛
⎞
+ ln S i ⎜⎜ ∑ β hS ln hi + ∑ β nS ln wn ,i ⎟⎟
n=M ,L,K
⎝ h = y ,T ,G
⎠

where i indexes states (i =1, 2, …, 48 ). In this study, labor (L), purchased inputs (M),
and capital (K) are treated as variable inputs, while land (T) is considered a private fixed
input. Note that the stock of spill-ins is treated differently than the own-state stock of
R&D: while G is fully usable by the state and is treated similarly to the private fixed
factor T, S is only partially usable and enters the variable cost through interaction terms.
In addition, since agricultural production is sensitive to the geoclimatic
characteristics (soil type, humidity, etc.) of the area in which it is conducted, farms in
different locations might use different technologies of production, this being another
source of structural spatial heterogeneity across states (Anselin, 1988). This translog
function incorporates fixed state effects, represented by the dummy variables DUMj that
capture, structurally, the unobservable characteristics of each state that influence local
agricultural production. Note that these parameters are interacted with input prices in
their levels to allow for fixed effects in the derived input demands. In addition to the
inclusion of terms in the specification of the cost function to capture structural
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differences and interactions across states, this study allows stochastic spatial interaction
with the purpose of using information that might not be captured structurally.
For each state i, the three private input share equations (n=M, K, L), the virtual
share of the private fixed input T, and the virtual shares of the public fixed inputs G and S
implied by (16) are derived using Shephard’s lemma, respectively, as (i subscripts
omitted for simplicity of exposition):
(17) SH n =

wn n
∂ ln c
=
= ∑ δ n , j DUM j + ∑ β nm ln wm + ∑ β nh ln h
c
∂ ln wn
j
m=M ,L,K
h = y ,T ,G , S

(18) ε c ,T = −

⎡
⎤
∂ ln c Z T T
=
= − ⎢δ T + ∑ β nT ln wn + ∑ β hT ln h + β TS ln S ⎥
∂ ln T
c
n= L,K ,M
h = y ,T ,G
⎣
⎦

(19) ε c ,G = −

⎡
⎤
∂ ln c Z G G
=
= − ⎢δ G + ∑ β nG ln wn + ∑ β hG ln h + β GS ln S ⎥
∂ ln G
c
n= L,K ,M
h = y ,T ,G
⎣
⎦

(20) ε c , S = −

⎡
⎤
∂ ln c Z S S
=
= − ⎢ ∑ β nS ln wn + ∑ β hS ln h ⎥
∂ ln S
c
h = y ,T ,G
⎣n= L, K ,M
⎦

Equations (18), (19) and (20) are, respectively, the elasticity of cost with respect to land,
the elasticity of cost with respect to the own state stock of public agricultural R&D, and
the elasticity of cost with respect to the stock of spill-ins from public agricultural R&D
conducted in neighboring states. These elasticities can be either positive or negative,
depending on the free disposability of the fixed inputs and their levels with respect to
their long-run optimum.
In order to estimate the own state IRR to public expenditures in agricultural R&D,
expression (11) can be conveniently expressed as the discounted sum of the shadow
values of Gi over time weighted by the research expenditure weights used to construct the
stocks of public agricultural R&D from equation (14)

13

m

ΔGi ,t0 + q

q =1

ΔRi ,t0

(21) 0 = 1 + ∑ Z Gi ,t0 + q

m

1

(1 + r )q

= 1+ ∑
q =1

ϖ t0 + q Z Gi ,t0 + q

(1 + r )q

m

= 1+ ∑
q =1

Bi ,t0 + q

(1 + r )q

where Bi ,t = ϖ t Z Gi ,t is a direct measure of the own state monetary benefits at t from an
extra dollar invested in public agricultural R&D at t0. We use equation (19) with ϖ t0 = 0
to evaluate equation (21) and obtain the own state IRR to investment in public
agricultural R&D in each of the 48 states.
Similarly, using equations (13), (14) and (15), the social IRR r1 can be expressed
as:
⎛

m

(22)

−1 = ∑
q =0
m

=∑
q =0

ϖ t0 + q Z Gi ,t0 + q

(1 + r1 )

q

ϖ t0 + q Fi ,t0 + q

(1 + r1 )q

m

+ ∑∑
j ≠i q =0

m

=∑
q =0

ϖ t0 + q Z Sij ,t0 + q

(1 + r1 )

q

⎞

m

ϖ t0 + q ⎜⎜ Z Gi ,t0 + q + ∑ Z Sij ,t0 + q ⎟⎟

q =0

(1 + r1 )

=∑

⎝

j ≠i

⎠

q

∗
i ,t 0 + q

B

(1 + r1 )q

where Fi ,t is the social shadow value of Gi at time t; and Bi*,t = ϖ t Fi ,t measures social
monetary benefits at time t from an extra dollar invested in public agricultural R&D in
state i at t0. We use equations (19) and (20) to estimate r1.
If ZSi ≥ 0 then r1 ≥ r, indicating that the total benefits of R&D are at least as big as
the benefits that accrue only to the state where the expenses were incurred.

3. Data

The agricultural production variables for all 48 states for the period 1949-1991 are
from Craig, Pardey and Acquaye (2002) 14 . According to Acquaye, Alston and Pardey
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This data set was available at http://www.apec.umn.edu/faculty/ppardey/data.html, but it is no longer on
line. It is the data set used in Acquaye, Alston and Pardey (2003). This data set has been revised and
extended over 1949-2002 (Pardey, Andersen and Craig, 2007), but is not publicly available. Comparing the
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(2003) this data set “was developed with a view in particular to measuring the effects of
public agricultural R&D on productivity” and it included Fisher Ideal quantity indexes
for agricultural output, labor, purchased inputs, capital and land, expenditures in land,
labor, purchased inputs and capital, and the value of total agricultural output for each
state (see Appendix 1). The variable cost in this study is the sum of expenditures in labor,
purchased inputs and capital for farm production in constant 1949 dollars. 15 In order to
reflect the differences in the relative sizes of the agricultural sector across states, we
multiplied quantity indexes for land and output by their respective expenditures in
1949. 16
The own-state R&D stock G was constructed as a 31-year weighted average of
gross public expenditures in agricultural R&D at state level in constant U.S. dollars,
according to (14). 17 As in McCunn and Huffman (2000), the reason for using political

descriptive statistics of the newer series from Table 1 in Andersen, Alston and Pardey (2007) to the older
series, capital seems to have been revised downwards (the mean, the minimum and the maximum values
are about 5% lower in the newer data set than in the older one, while the standard deviation is only 1.5%
higher). The output series also seems to have suffered significant revision: the minimum value is 24%
lower and the standard deviation is 19% higher in the newer data set, while the mean is only 1.6% higher.
We did not use the1960-1993 data set from O'Donnel, Shumway and Ball (1999) because it was revised
and modified after 1993. Alternatively we could have used the data developed by ERS (1998) to obtain
indexes of productivity by state for 1960-1996 or the revised version used in Ball, Butault and Nehring
(2001). But the state-level expenditures in agricultural inputs used in the construction of their quantity
indexes and needed for our estimation were not available to us.
15
We obtained the series of expenditures in purchased inputs, capital and labor in constant 1949 dollars by
multiplying the Fisher Ideal input quantity indexes (1949=100) by the expenditures in each input in 1949.
According to Acquaye, Alston and Pardey (2003), data for labor comprise 30 farm operator classes (five
age and six education characteristics), family labor, and hired labor. Data for purchased inputs involve
pesticides, fertilizers, fuel, seed, feed, repairs, machine hire, and miscellaneous expenses. Capital involves
buildings and structures, automobiles (units not for personal use), trucks, pickers and balers, mowers and
conditioners, tractors, combines, dairy cattle, breeder pigs, sheep and cows, and chickens (not broilers)
16
Land comprises cropland, irrigated cropland and grassland, pasture, range and grazed forest. Agricultural
output aggregates field crops, fruits and nuts, vegetables and livestock
17
Evenson (1989), Huffman and Evenson (1989, 1992, 1993, 2001), and Khanna, Huffman and Sandler
(1994) have constructed and used R&D stocks for U.S. states but these data sets have not been made
public. We proceed to build our own for the purpose of this study. The mean of G in our study closely
resembles the mean of Huffman and Evenson’s “public agricultural research capital for an originating
state”: $1.73 million in 1949 dollars or $10.1 million in 1986 dollars. The mean of S in our study is lower
than the mean of Huffman and Evenson’s “public agricultural research capital spillin”: $7.65 million vs.

15

rather than geoclimatic borders is our focus on public funding, which is based on political
borders. The weights ϖ t are constructed by transforming Chavas and Cox’s (1992)
estimated marginal effects of public research expenditures on U.S. agricultural
productivity, CC t , to add up to one:
(23) ϖ t0 +i =

CC t0 +i
31

∑ CC
i =1

t0 + i

The weights follow an inverted-V distribution of the lags of the effects of R&D
on productivity through time implying a gestation period of seven years, followed by an
eight year period of increasing effects at a low rate, and another eight year period of
increasing effects at a higher rate, reaching a maximum in year twenty three, and
declining to zero from there onwards by year thirty one. 18 These estimates are appealing
because they were obtained using non-parametric methods, avoiding strong distributional
assumptions required in parametric estimation. 19 Gross public expenditures include all
USDA appropriations, CSREES administered funds, state appropriations, and other
federal and non-federal funds for State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) and
1890 Institutions. 20 Data on total public agricultural R&D expenditures at the state level

$8.86 million in 1949 dollars, or $44.7 million vs. $51.8 million in 1986 dollars. We were unable to
compare the distribution of our variables to theirs. This is true for variables G and S in our study.
18
Different studies adopt different weight structures: inverted-V form (Evenson 1967), second order
polynomial (Knutson and Tweeten) or trapezoidal (Huffman and Evenson 1989).
19
We realize that the marginal effects of public agricultural research expenditure on agricultural
productivity might be endogenous to each state and are likely to differ among states. But given that no
publicly available study estimates the marginal effects for each state, we use a set of estimated marginal
effects at the national aggregate to compute the R&D stocks. While some early studies used 10- or 20-year
lags (Evenson 1967, Knutson and Tweeten, White and Havlicek), more recent studies suggest that in order
to properly capture the benefits of investment in research on agricultural production, lags of at least 30
years must be used in the construction of the stocks (Pardey and Craig (1989), Schimmelpfennig and
Thirtle (1994), Alston, Craig and Pardey (1998), Alston and Pardey (2001)).
20
USDA appropriations for the Forest Service, the Mc Intire-Stennis Act from the CSREES Administered
Funds, and all funds for Forestry Schools are excluded.
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in current U.S. dollars were obtained from the Current Research Information System
Database (CRIS) for the period 1970-1991. Given the long lags assumed to construct the
stock, data is needed for earlier periods and for the years 1919-1969, we have data only
for agricultural R&D expenditures at SAES. These were collected, in current dollars,
from several USDA reports. These series were used to construct a proxy for total
agricultural R&D expenditures at the state level for the years 1919-1969 using the
average ratio of total to SAES agricultural R&D expenditures in 1970-1980 and
extrapolating to 1919. 21 An agricultural R&D price index was constructed for the period
1919-1999 from Huffman and Evenson (1993) and USDA data, which was used to
express the expenditure series in constant 1949 dollars. 22
The spill-in variable S is constructed as the sum of the stocks of public
agricultural R&D of the states that share common borders or vertices with the state under
analysis, indexed by j and i, respectively, in equation (6). The geographical proximity
criteria to construct spillover variables has previously been used by Khanna, Huffman
and Sandler (1994), Huffman et al (2002), and Yee et al (2002) to reflect similarities in
climatic conditions, production conditions, input-output mixes, etc., among the states
under analysis. 23 In the present study, S captures the effects of structural spill-ins from

21

A similar methodology has been applied by Khanna, Huffman and Sandler (1994) and Yee et.al. (2002).
The concept of deflated total public agricultural R&D expenditures in this study resembles that of total
public expenditures on agricultural research used by Khanna, Huffman and Sandler (1994). The main
difference is that forestry funds are excluded from the present study. We have not been able to do a
numerical comparison as their data is not publicly available.
23
Alston (2002) reports that a paper in press by Alston, James, Pardey and Zhang uses a different measure
of similarity, based on technological proximity across states according to their output mixes rather than
geographical proximity, and that significant inter-state spillover effects are found. However, the paper in
press by Alston et al is not publicly available yet. We experimented using the uncentered output-mix
correlation coefficient among states to construct the state-state stock of structural spillovers based on the
agricultural technological similarity across states in the spirit of Alston et al (in press), and the value of the
resulting structural spillover stocks were very similar to the values of the structural spillovers obtained
based on geographical proximity. We also tried to find a pattern of technological similarity across states by
applying cluster analysis techniques to the states’ agricultural output-mix, and the results were highly
22
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R&D conducted in neighboring states. For example, S for Nebraska consists of the sum
of the stocks of R&D in Wyoming, South Dakota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas and Colorado.
See Appendix 1 for the descriptive statistics of the variables in the analysis.

4. Estimation and Results

This section is organized as follows. Two versions of the model consisting of the
cost function and the capital and purchased inputs shares, equations (16) and (17), are
estimated maintaining symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices. Model 1 assumes that
the spill-in variable S captures all relevant knowledge spillovers across states, i.e. it
models structural spatial dependency. To test for the existence of stochastic effects of
knowledge spillovers beyond the structural effects captured by S, a modified version of
the Keleijian and Robinson (1992) test is performed on the residuals of Model 1. This test
provides an assessment of the extent of the propagation of spillovers not captured by the
variable S, and of the impact of any event that affects adjacent states and is not captured
in the structure of the model. It indicates the necessity to acknowledge and model
stochastic spatial dependency. Model 2 is estimated using three-stage generalized spatial
least squares (3SGSLS) to correct for the stochastic effects. Results from Model 2 are
then compared to those from Model 1 to assess the effect of failing to account for
stochastic dependency among states. The best model is selected on the basis of the

dependent on the method used (single linkage, average linkage or centroid) and the criteria used to define
the optimal number of clusters (hierarchical tree diagram, pseudo F statistic or pseudo Hotteling’s T2 test
statistic)
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McElroy System R-square 24 and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for each
equation.
The variable cost and the purchased inputs and capital shares in Model 1 are
estimated using iterative seemingly unrelated least squares (ITSUR in version SAS 9.1).
The share of labor has been dropped from the estimation to avoid singularity of the
estimation matrix and its parameters recovered using the set of restrictions imposed. One
hundred and seventy four parameters are estimated with 6192 observations (three stacked
equations and 43 years for each of the 48 states.) The model fits the data reasonably
well, with a system R2 of 0.896 and adjusted R2 for each estimating equation greater than
0.8. These parameters conform to symmetry and homogeneity as these properties have
been imposed in estimation. The Hessian is negative semi-definite at the mean of the
data for each state implying concavity of the cost in prices at the mean of the data. The
cost function is non-decreasing in output as the marginal cost evaluated at the mean of
the data is positive for all states. Parameter estimates are reported in Appendix 2.
Given that our main objective is the estimation of returns to local public inputs
and the calculation of the implied IRR for public R&D investments we focus on these
estimates. The effects of public inputs on the demand for private variable inputs is
computed from equations (19) and (20). 25 The effects of G and S on purchased inputs and
labor are statistically significant for all states, but their effects on capital are not. An
increase in G or in S generates an increase in the demand for purchased inputs and a
decrease in the demand for labor, suggesting that technical change induced by public

24

The McElroy System R-square is a weighted average of the R-square for each equation in the system,
and is bounded to the 0-1 interval (Greene 2003, p.345).
25
Estimates indicate that, at the mean, land is a substitute for purchased inputs and capital, and a
complement for labor in all states.
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agricultural R&D has been biased towards the use of purchased inputs and against the use
of labor in all states. 26
The most important estimates for our purpose are the estimates of the shadow
prices for public inputs G and S as they enter directly the calculation of the IRRs. The
shadow price of the own state stock of public agricultural R&D as defined in equations
(4) and (19) is evaluated at the sample mean of all variables and for each state and it is
reported in the second column of Table 1. Z G measures the amount of cost savings in the
production of output at constant 1949 dollars stemming from the public provision of an
extra unit of G. Alternatively, Z G measures producers’ willingness to pay for an extra
unit of stock of public local agricultural R&D. For example, the shadow value of G for
Nebraska is, at the mean, $414.69, indicating that a $1 increase in the stock of public
agricultural R&D in Nebraska in a given year generated annual cost savings to
agricultural producers of, on average, $414.69. The estimates of Z G are statistically
significant and positive for all states but California, Maine, and Maryland. As shown
below, the fact that Z G is not statistically different from zero for California, Maine, and
Maryland is driven by the inability of Model 1 to incorporate the effects of stochastic
spatial dependency, resulting in estimates with wide confidence intervals. 27
Note, however, that in the present study a $1 increase in the stock of public
agricultural R&D in a given year requires a $1 investment in public agricultural R&D
26

Price elasticities evaluated at the mean of the data for each state indicate that own-price elasticities are
negative, as expected. Cross-price elasticities for all inputs evaluated at the mean are positive, indicating
that labor, purchased materials and capital are substitutes in production. Marginal cost elasticities evaluated
at the mean of the data show 26 states with increasing returns to scale and 22 states with decreasing returns
to scale.
27

The coefficients of variation are 107%, 242% and 51% for California, Maine and Maryland respectively.
Coefficient of variation= standard error /|mean|
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activities during the previous 31 years. Therefore, the own state annual average monetary
benefit from investing an extra dollar in public agricultural R&D in t0, is
31

(24) B = ∑ Bt
i =1

0 +i

31 ,

where B refers to own state benefits as defined in equation (21), and is a more intuitive
measure of the benefits from R&D investments in agriculture (second column of Table
1). The 31-year annual average benefits vary from $0.63 for New York to $23.28 for
Missouri for every $1 invested (constant 1949 dollars), and the national simple average
amounts to $7.63 with a standard deviation among states of $5.43. The national weighted
average of the own state benefits, with the weights being each state’s average share in
total output, amounts to $8.22 and is significant at the 1% level. It must be emphasized,
however, that given the distribution assumed in constructing the research stock variable,
the impacts are assumed to be higher in the distant future than in the years immediately
following the investment.
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Table 1. Own state and social shadow values (Z, F) and benefits (B, B*) from
agricultural R&D, no stochastic spatial dependency (Model 1, constant 1949 dollars)
STATE
ZG
B
F
B*
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA

226.42 (9.11)
608.53 (27.48)
126.93 (5.08)
-15.9 (16.95)
214.5 (9.86)
66.2 (4.77)
193.1 (15.39)
27.7 (6.81)
173.03 (10.51)
430.66 (28.19)
275.95 (12.16)
171.61 (13.23)
275.7 (13.57)
410.22 (23.86)
311.79 (14.78)
51.7 (5.42)
118.5 (7.4)
-5.14 (2.64)
-9.82 (23.74)
298.21 (12.5)
359.97 (23.12)
675.1 (32.11)
96.96 (7.5)
148.62 (9.38)
266.31 (16.07)
128.96 (8.36)
414.69 (22.71)
105.79 (16.04)
65.93 (4.68)
302.95 (14.2)
172.85 (12.68)
19.4 (6.97)
241.41 (11.88)
249.73 (9.25)
130.88 (12.61)
214.87 (11.47)
32.83 (4.48)
92.81 (7.99)
721.77 (36.73)
510.12 (21.14)
113.32 (20.09)
116.51 (12.18)
343.09 (13.28)
421.46 (24.33)
44.95 (11.28)

7.30 (0.082)
19.63 (0.249)
4.09 (0.046)
n/a
6.92 (0.089)
2.14 (0.043)
6.23 (0.139)
0.89 (0.062)
5.58 (0.095)
13.89 (0.255)
8.90 (0.110)
5.54 (0.120)
8.89 (0.123)
13.23 (0.216)
10.06 (0.134)
1.67 (0.049)
3.82 (0.067)
n/a
n/a
9.62 (0.113)
11.61 (0.209)
21.78 (0.291)
3.13 (0.068)
4.79 (0.085)
8.59 (0.145)
4.16 (0.076)
13.38 (0.205)
3.41 (0.145)
2.13 (0.042)
9.77 (0.128)
5.58 (0.115)
0.63 (0.063)
7.79 (0.107)
8.06 (0.084)
4.22 (0.114)
6.93 (0.104)
1.06 (0.041)
2.99 (0.072)
23.28 (0.332)
16.46 (0.191)
3.66 (0.182)
3.76 (0.110)
11.07 (0.120)
13.60 (0.220)
1.45 (0.102)

759.57 (18.76)
1987.12 (49.99)
1021.54 (33.09)
367.04 (19.40)
1747.31 (58.14)
239.98 (11.49)
386.26 (19.19)
280.25 (13.14)
882.39 (28.29)
1903.17 (64.29)
1204.72 (34.82)
1815.68 (59.57)
1179.57 (30.00)
1434.58 (44.22)
1906.61 (53.69)
809.63 (24.97)
315.37 (19.41)
374.39 (25.13)
-29.03 (25.41)
1552.31 (42.67)
1525.61 (51.36)
2792.67 (83.15)
793.26 (24.36)
891.18 (35.1)
834.11 (27.11)
811.07 (35.2)
2112.61 (79.8)
255.01 (21.51)
296.8 (15.91)
1447.21 (38.23)
1076.17 (32.54)
369.16 (26.59)
1196.53 (32.36)
1846.47 (66)
859.55 (25.62)
642.32 (25.75)
117.54 (7.34)
385.78 (15.08)
2275.57 (63.4)
1936.01 (48.88)
764.04 (28.48)
1021.92 (35.42)
938.1 (22.95)
564.29 (25.78)
408.34 (15.15)

24.5 (0.170)
64.1 (0.452)
32.95 (0.299)
11.84 (0.176)
56.36 (0.526)
7.74 (0.104)
12.46 (0.174)
9.04 (0.119)
28.46 (0.256)
61.39 (0.582)
38.86 (0.315)
58.57 (0.539)
38.05 (0.271)
46.28 (0.400)
61.5 (0.486)
26.12 (0.226)
10.17 (0.176)
12.08 (0.227)
n/a
50.07 (0.386)
49.21 (0.465)
90.09 (0.752)
25.59 (0.220)
28.75 (0.318)
26.91 (0.245)
26.16 (0.318)
68.15 (0.722)
8.23 (0.195)
9.57 (0.144)
46.68 (0.346)
34.72 (0.294)
11.91 (0.241)
38.60 (0.293)
59.56 (0.597)
27.73 (0.232)
20.72 (0.233)
3.79 (0.066)
12.44 (0.136)
73.41 (0.574)
62.45 (0.442)
24.65 (0.258)
32.97 (0.320)
30.26 (0.208)
18.20 (0.233)
13.17 (0.137)
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WI
WV

290.79 (13.65)
210.93 (11.10)

9.38 (0.123)
6.80 (0.100)

1301.38 (35.79)
829.04 (24.83)

41.98 (0.324)
26.74 (0.225)

WY

171.29 (12.15)

5.53 (0.110)
7.63

1501.56 (56.36)
1,040.25

48.44 (0.510)
34.29

Simple National Average

221.13

Simple National Std.Dev

173.72

5.43

656.54

20.78

254.73 (16.85)

8.22 (0.15)

1253.72 (41.10)

40.44 (0.37)

Weighted Nat’l. Average

Approximated standard errors in parentheses. 28 n/a: Not available

The average social shadow value of G,
31

(25) F = ∑ Ft0 +i 31
i =1

where F is the social shadow value of research stocks defined in equation (22), and the
average social monetary benefits from an extra dollar invested in agricultural R&D in t0,
31

(26) B * = ∑ Bt*
i =1

31 ,

0 +i

where B* refers to social benefits as defined in equation (22), are reported for each state
in the last two columns of Table 1. Except for Maine, all estimates of F are positive and
significantly different from zero. As expected, F is greater than Z G , implying a positive
shadow value for research spillovers,

∑Z
j ≠i

Sji

. The implied annual averages of the social

benefits from R&D, in 1949 dollars, range from $3.79 (Rhode Island) to $90.09
(Missouri). The national simple average is $34.29 with a standard deviation across states
of $20.78. The national weighted average of the social benefits, with the weights being
each state’s average shares in total output, amounts to $40.44 and is significant at the 1%
level.
The estimated average marginal IRR from own state investment in public
∧

agricultural R&D, r , is obtained by plugging the estimate of Z G from Table 1 into
28

Approximated standard errors obtained by the Delta method (Greene 2003).
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equation (21) and solving for r. Similarly, the estimated average marginal IRR from
∧

social investments in public agricultural R&D, r 1 , is obtained by plugging the estimate
of F from Table 1 into equation (22) and solving for r1. Ninety five percent confidence
∧

∧

intervals for r and r 1 for each state are obtained by plugging the corresponding shadow
values plus/minus two standard errors in equations (21) and (22), respectively (Table 2
and Figures 1 and 2). The simple average own state IRR for the nation is 26.9%, with a
standard deviation of 8.91% across states. The weighted average own state IRR for the
nation is 27.4%, and the 95% confidence interval is [26.2%; 29.5%]. The highest own
state IRR is 39% and corresponds to South Dakota. The simple average social IRR for
the nation is 40%, with a standard deviation of 8.38%. The weighted average social IRR
for the nation is 42.3%, and the 95% confidence interval is [41.7%; 43.0%]. The highest
social IRR is 51% and corresponds to Missouri. In all states but Maine the social IRR is
significantly higher than the own state IRR, as indicated by the non-overlapping
confidence intervals reported below the IRR estimates in Table 2.
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Table 2. Own state (r) and social (r1 ) IRRs (in percentage), no stochastic spatial
effects (Model 1), 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.
∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

State

r

r1

State

r

r1

State

r

r1

AL

30.08
[29.5;30.6]
37.58
[36.8;38.3]
26.08
[25.5;26.6]
n/a
[n/a;14.2]
29.69
[29.0;30.3]
21.88
[20.9;22.7]
28.95
[27.7;30.0]
16.67
[12.9;19.0]
28.19
[27.3;29.0]
34.85
[33.8;35.8]
31.5
[30.8;32.1]
28.13
[27.0;29.1]
31.5
[30.7;32.2]
34.47
[33.5;35.3]
32.4
[31.7;33.1]
20.36
[18.9;21.5]
25.62
[24.7;26.4]

39.41
[39.0;39.8]
48.05
[47.6;48.5]
41.94
[41.4;42.5]
33.63
[32.8;34.4]
46.82
[46.2;47.4]
30.49
[29.8;31.2]
34.01
[33.2;34.7]
31.62
[30.9;32.3]
40.67
[40.1;41.2]
47.63
[47.0;48.3]
43.39
[42.9;43.9]
47.18
[46.5;47.8]
43.21
[42.7;43.6]
44.98
[44.4;45.5]
47.65
[47.1;48.2]
39.94
[39.4;40.5]
32.49
[31.5;33.4]

MD

n/a
[n/a,n/a]
n/a
[n/a;18.5]
32.07
[31.4;32.7]
33.48
[32.4;34.4]
38.43
[37.6;39.2]
24.31
[23.2;25.2]
27.14
[26.2;28.0]
31.25
[30.3;32.1]
26.19
[25.3;27.0]
34.56
[33.7;35.4]
24.88
[22.6;26.6]
21.86
[20.9;22.7]
32.19
[31.5;32.9]
28.18
[27.1;29.1]
14.66
[8.0;17.7]
30.54
[29.8;31.2]
30.78
[30.2;31.3]

33.78
[32.7;34.7]
n/a
[n/a;15.3]
45.71
[45.2;46.2]
45.54
[44.9;46.2]
51.43
[50.8;52.0]
39.77
[39.2;40.3]
40.76
[40.1;41.4]
40.2
[39.6;40.7]
39.96
[39.2;40.7]
48.64
[47.9;49.4]
30.93
[29.6;32.1]
32.04
[31.2;32.8]
45.06
[44.6;45.5]
42.39
[41.8;42.9]
33.67
[32.5;34.7]
43.33
[42.8;43.8]
47.34
[46.6;48.0]

OR

26.29
[24.9;27.5]
29.7
[28.9;30.4]
17.65
[15.8;19.1]
24.03
[22.8;25.1]
38.98
[38.1;39.8]
36.17
[35.5;36.8]
25.33
[22.5;27.4]
25.51
[24.0;26.8]
33.12
[32.5;33.7]
34.68
[33.7;35.5]
19.51
[15.5;22.0]
31.89
[31.2;32.6]
29.57
[28.8;30.3]
28.12
[27.1;29.0]
28.65
[25.7;28.5]

40.45
[39.9;40.9]
38.02
[37.3;38.7]
25.57
[24.7;26.4]
34
[33.4;34.6]
49.37
[48.8;49.9]
47.8
[47.3;48.3]
39.46
[38.8;40.1]
41.94
[41.3;42.5]
41.2
[40.8;41.6]
36.98
[36.2;37.7]
34.44
[33.9;35]
44.09
[43.6;44.6]
40.14
[39.6;40.6]
45.4
[44.7;46.1]
39.84
[39.2;40.8]

27.37
[26.2;29.5]

42.33
[41.7;43.0]

AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA

ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK

PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
SNA*
WNA.*

Note: n/a: IRR can not be calculated since the corresponding shadow value is negative. SNA: Simple
National Average. WNA: Weighted National Average*The bounds of the confidence interval for the
National Average are calculated as the average of the respective bounds for all states.
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Figure 1. Histogram of the own state IRR’s, ( r ) – Model 1
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Figure 2. Histogram of the social IRR’s, ( r 1 ) – Model 1

6

Frequency

5
4
3
2
1
0
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

r (%)

26

A modified version of the Keleijian and Robinson (KR) test for spatial
autocorrelation in systems of equations, from Cohen and Morrison Paul is used on the
errors of Model 1 to test for stochastic spatial dependence across states. The KR test
provides an estimate of the number of significant spatial lags in each equation. It is a
large sample test based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) and it does not
require the model to be linear, the disturbance terms to be normal, or the pattern of spatial
correlation to be specified. The KR test requires an a priori choice of the neighboring
states that might be spatially correlated, but it does not require knowledge of the spatial
weights. A geographical pattern of proximity among states is proposed as the driving
force for spatial autocorrelation in the error structure. For each state, the U.S. map is
divided in concentric “rings” with the state under analysis as its center, the states that
share a common border or intercept with the center as the first “ring” of neighboring
states; the states that are detached from the center but share common borders or intercepts
with the first “ring” as the second “ring” of neighboring states; and so on and so forth. 29
In this geographical partitioning of the space, states are expected to be more closely
related to immediate neighboring states than those farther away. The results from the KR
test suggest that there exists stochastic spatial dependency among states that are as much
as four states apart from one another. This would be consistent with knowledge
spillovers flowing widely across states and generating the spatial lag structures. 30 The

29

For example, Wyoming, South Dakota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas and Colorado belong to the first “ring” of
neighboring states for Nebraska; while New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas and Oklahoma form its second “ring” of
neighboring states; Texas, California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, West
Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia form its third “ring” of
neighboring states.
30
We cannot discard the possibility of other variables not included in the model structure, like weather for
example, adding to this dependency. In any case IRRs should be corrected if spatial dependency is present
no matter what the source.
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variable cost function, ln c , and the capital share, SH K , support a spatial lag length of 5,
while the share of purchased inputs, SH M , has a spatial lag of length 4.
To incorporate the effects of stochastic spatial dependency in the estimation of
the benefits from public agricultural R&D, Model 2 is estimated using the GS3SLS
procedure proposed by Keleijian and Prucha (2004). The first stage corresponds to the
estimation of Model 1. In the second stage, the residuals from Model 1 and the lag
structure suggested by the KR test are used to estimate the spatial autocorrelation
parameters for each estimating equation using GMM. The estimates of the spatial
autocorrelation parameters (Table 3), which are all bounded to the unit circle, are used to
perform a Cochrane-Orcutt-type transformation on the observed variables, in a similar
fashion to the standard procedure to correct for serial autocorrelation in time series. In the
third stage, Model 2 determined by equations (16) and (17) is re-estimated on the
transformed variables with symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices maintained.
Table 3. Estimates of the spatial autocorrelation parameters. 31
ρ3
ρ5
ρ1
ρ2
ρ4
Equation
0.265554 0.493288 0.196007 -0.37656 0.180117
ln c
SH K
0.634002 -0.14269 0.22608 0.063719 0.010952
SH M
0.587572 -0.05815 0.353718 -0.19113

The share of labor has been dropped from the estimation to avoid singularity as in
estimation of Model 1. One hundred and seventy four parameters are estimated with 6192
observations (three stacked equations and 43 years for each of the 48 states) in Model 2.
The system R-square for Model 2 (R2=0.911) is higher than the one from Model 1, and
the AICs are lower for each estimating equation. Model 2 provides a better fit to the
31

Standard errors for estimates in Table 3 are not reported because the significance of the spatial effects has
been determined through the KR test, as a previous step to the estimation of the ρ’s using GMM.
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transformed data than Model 1 does to the untransformed data. The estimated parameters
conform to symmetry and homogeneity as these properties have been imposed in the
estimation. The Hessian is negative semi-definite at the mean of the data for each state
implying concavity of the cost in prices at the mean of the data. The cost function is nondecreasing in output as the marginal cost evaluated at the mean of the data is positive for
all states. 32 The estimates from Model 2 and the associated goodness of fit measures are
reported in Appendix 3.
The effects of G and S on the demand for variable inputs (measured as the
elasticities of demand with respect to the fixed public inputs) are all significant in Model
2. An increase in G or S generates an increase in the demand for purchased inputs and
capital, and a decrease in the demand for labor, suggesting that technical change induced
by public agricultural R&D has been biased towards the use of purchased inputs and
capital and against labor. 33,34
The own state shadow value of G, Z G , and the own state monetary benefits from
an extra dollar invested in R&D in t0, B , are evaluated at the mean and reported for each
state in the first two columns of Table 4. The estimates of Z G are statistically significant
and positive for all states. 35 B ranges from $0.05 in Oregon to $2.63 in Maine and the
simple national average is $0.94, while the weighted national average is $1.02 and is

32

The marginal cost elasticities evaluated at the mean of the variables indicate increasing returns to scale
for all states, satisfying one of the necessary conditions for endogenous growth (Onofri and Fulginiti). A
second condition, namely that of non-negative returns to public inputs, is also satisfied as the estimates of
the shadows for public R&D in Table 4 show.
33
Land is a substitute for purchased inputs and capital, and a complement of labor.
34
For all states, the own-price elasticities are negative, as expected, and the cross-price elasticities for all
inputs are positive, indicating that labor, purchased materials and capital are substitutes.
35
The coefficients of variation for California, and Maine are now significantly lower than in Model 1
(55%, 18%, respectively), while the coefficient of variation for Maryland is higher (77%).
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statistically significant at the 1% level (constant 1949 dollars). The estimates of own state
benefits are now significantly lower than the own state benefits obtained in Model 1.
The social shadow value of public agricultural R&D, F , and the social monetary
benefits from an extra dollar invested in R&D in t0, B * , are evaluated at the mean and
reported for each state in the last two columns of Table 4. All social shadows are nonnegative and significantly different from zero. Social shadows are higher than own state
shadow values for public agricultural R&D stocks (estimates of F are greater than Z G ),
implying a positive shadow value for spillouts,

∑Z
j ≠i

Sji

. Social benefits, B * , range from

$0.33 in Rhode Island to $18.46 in Missouri, with a simple national average of $6.39
(constant 1949 dollars) and a weighted national average of $7.98, significant at the 1%
level. As mentioned before, benefits from the investments have a higher impact in the
distant future than in the years immediately following the investment in R&D.
Table 4. Own state and social shadow values ( Z G , F ) and benefits ( B , B * ) from
agricultural R&D, with stochastic spatial effects (Model 2, constant 1949 dollars)
STATE

AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA

ZG
34.9 (5.78)
51 (17.07)
11.6 (3.16)
17.1 (9.41)
21.1 (6.40)
14.4 (2.63)
33.2 (8.90)
22 (3.64)
31.5 (6.39)
37.1 (18.19)
31.7 (7.51)
12.3 (8.61)
29.4 (9.13)
62.3 (14.88)
14.3 (9.72)
5.5 (3.25)
22.4 (4.13)

B

F

B*

1.13 (0.052)
1.65 (0.154)
0.38 (0.029)
0.55 (0.085)
0.68 (0.058)
0.47 (0.024)
1.07 (0.081)
0.71 (0.033)
1.02 (0.058)
1.2 (0.165)
1.02 (0.068)
0.4 (0.078)
0.95 (0.083)
2.01 (0.135)
0.46 (0.088)
0.18 (0.029)
0.72 (0.037)

123.7 (15.79)
317.0 (40.70)
198.4 (24.39)
94.4 (12.34)
385.9 (43.37)
12.9 (8.41)
29.9 (12.86)
64.8 (8.56)
159.1 (21.18)
390.4 (46.32)
226.3 (26.90)
358.3 (44.04)
183.1 (24.95)
313.0 (33.41)
350.9 (42.92)
157.3 (19.09)
21.6 (13.30)

3.99 (0.143)
10.23 (0.368)
6.4 (0.221)
3.04 (0.112)
12.45 (0.392)
0.42 (0.076)
0.97 (0.116)
2.09 (0.077)
5.13 (0.192)
12.59 (0.419)
7.3 (0.243)
11.56 (0.398)
5.91 (0.226)
10.1 (0.302)
11.32 (0.388)
5.07 (0.173)
0.7 (0.12)

30

MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY

1.9 (1.42)
81.4 (14.80)
30 (8.27)
52.2 (14.40)
51.7 (20.58)
17.6 (4.60)
30 (5.88)
55.5 (9.75)
30.3 (5.19)
52.4 (14.32)
49.9 (9.32)
13 (2.63)
23.8 (8.07)
6.3 (6.96)
8.6 (3.78)
31.7 (7.86)
30.1 (6.23)
1.6 (7.67)
20.3 (7.56)
12.7 (2.56)
35.9 (4.51)
70.8 (21.84)
34.8 (13.23)
24.2 (11.91)
10.4 (7.20)
34.2 (8.31)
65.1 (13.25)
20.2 (6.84)
28.7 (9.29)
13.5 (6.21)
13.6 (7.01)
Simple National Average
29.25
Simple National Std.Dev
18.64
Weighted National Avg. 31.55 (10.48)
Approximated standard errors in parentheses.
∧

0.06 (0.013)
2.63 (0.134)
0.97 (0.075)
1.68 (0.13)
1.67 (0.186)
0.57 (0.042)
0.97 (0.053)
1.79 (0.088)
0.98 (0.047)
1.69 (0.13)
1.61 (0.084)
0.42 (0.024)
0.77 (0.073)
0.2 (0.063)
0.28 (0.034)
1.02 (0.071)
0.97 (0.056)
0.05 (0.069)
0.65 (0.068)
0.41 (0.023)
1.16 (0.041)
2.28 (0.198)
1.12 (0.12)
0.78 (0.108)
0.33 (0.065)
1.1 (0.075)
2.1 (0.12)
0.65 (0.062)
0.93 (0.084)
0.44 (0.056)
0.44 (0.063)
0.94
0.60
1.02 (0.095)

55.0 (15.76)
72.0 (15.52)
243.9 (34.21)
313.7 (36.78)
572.3 (63.53)
174.3 (18.59)
231.6 (25.33)
175.1 (19.58)
214.2 (24.12)
525.6 (56.47)
80.6 (13.73)
16.8 (11.33)
240 (30.81)
172.7 (24.64)
20.7 (17.32)
185.9 (26.30)
444.6 (47.68)
143.4 (20.04)
34.1 (19.68)
10.4 (4.96)
96 (10.45)
420 (49.68)
342.2 (40.86)
168.5 (20.00)
228.5 (26.57)
122.6 (19.00)
58.9 (16.08)
98.6 (11.24)
212.3 (28.65)
80.3 (19.50)
359.4 (41.15)
197.95
141.88
247.4 (30.52)

1.78 (0.143)
2.32 (0.14)
7.87 (0.31)
10.12 (0.333)
18.46 (0.575)
5.62 (0.168)
7.47 (0.229)
5.65 (0.177)
6.91 (0.218)
16.96 (0.511)
2.6 (0.124)
0.54 (0.103)
7.74 (0.279)
5.57 (0.223)
0.67 (0.157)
6 (0.238)
14.34 (0.431)
4.63 (0.181)
1.1 (0.178)
0.33 (0.045)
3.1 (0.095)
13.55 (0.449)
11.04 (0.37)
5.44 (0.181)
7.37 (0.24)
3.96 (0.172)
1.9 (0.145)
3.18 (0.102)
6.85 (0.259)
2.59 (0.176)
11.59 (0.372)
6.39
4.58
7.98 (0.276)

∧

The estimated own state ( r ) and social ( r 1 ) IRRs consistent with Model 2 for
each state are reported in Table 5 and Figures 3 through 6, along with their 95%
confidence intervals. The highest average own state IRR corresponds to Maine and
equals 23.18%, while the lowest corresponds to Oregon and equals 2%. The simple
average own state IRR for the nation is 16% with a standard deviation across states of
4.51%. The weighted average own state IRR for the nation is 16.5%, with a 95%
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confidence interval ranging from 8.6% to 19.8%. In all states but California, Maryland
and Maine (states where the own state IRR could not be estimated in Model 1), the own
state IRR from Model 2 is significantly lower than that from Model 1. 36
These estimates are consistent with the estimates of returns to investments in
public agricultural R&D and extension by Lu, Cline and Quance (25%), White and
Havlicek (7-36%), Evenson (11-45%), Oehmke (11.6%), and Alston, Craig and Pardey
(7-31%). However, they are significantly lower than the rates estimated in most other
studies. Evenson (2001) reports IRRs to aggregate public sector agricultural research (not
including extension) from several studies ranging from 25% to 212%.
The social IRRs from Model 2 range from 11.26% in Rhode Island to 37.09% in
Missouri. The simple national average is 27% and its standard deviation across states is
6.56%. The weighted national average is 29.3%, and the 95% confidence interval is
[26.5% ; 31.1%]. The social IRRs are lower in Model 2 than in Model 1 for all states
except for Maine (state for which the social IRR could not be calculated in Model 1).
These are significant differences as indicated by the non-overlapping confidence
intervals. The social IRRs obtained from Models 1 are, on average, 14% higher than the
ones estimated with Model 2.
Our estimates of the social IRRs, once correction has been made for stochastic
spatial dependency, even though impressive relative to market returns of private
investments, are significantly lower than those calculated by Evenson (1989), Huffman
and Evenson (1993, 2006), and Yee et al (2002). These authors estimate rates between
49% and 600%.

36

Mean difference of 12.8% and a standard deviation of 4.6%.
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∧

∧

Table 5. Own state ( r ) and social ( r 1 ) IRRs, with stochastic spatial effects (Model 2)

95% confidence intervals in parentheses
∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

State

r

r1

State

r

r1

State

r

r1

AL

18.01
[15.7;19.7]
20.28
[13.9;23.5]
11.88
[7.8;14.2]
13.97
[n/a;18.2]
15.13
[10.1;17.8]
13.04
[10.6;14.7]
17.73
[13.4;20.3]
15.36
[13.1;17.0]
17.41
[14.5;19.4]
18.38
[n/a;22.5]
17.45
[13.8;19.7]
12.19
[n/a;17.0]
17.02
[11.7;19.9]
21.5
[17.6;24.0]
13
[n/a;17.8]
7.97
[n/a;12.0]
15.46
[12.9;17.3]

25.91
[24.0;27.4]
32.53
[30.4;34.3]
29.14
[27.2;30.7]
24.13
[22.2;25.7]
34.01
[32.1;35.6]
12.42
[n/a;17.1]
17.12
[6.7;20.8]
21.75
[19.9;23.2]
27.61
[25.5;29.2]
34.1
[32.1;35.7]
30.07
[28.2;31.6]
33.44
[31.4;35.1]
28.58
[26.4;30.3]
32.43
[30.7;33.9]
33.29
[31.2;35.0]
27.53
[25.7;29.0]
15.26
[n/a;19.9]

MD

2.78
[n/a;7.2]
23.18
[20.4;25.2]
17.12
[12.6;19.7]
20.42
[15.7;23.2]
20.36
[11.4;24.0]
14.12
[10.2;16.5]
17.12
[14.3;19.1]
20.79
[18.2;22.7]
17.19
[14.8;18.9]
20.44
[15.8;23.2]
20.15
[17.4;22.1]
12.46
[9.7;14.3]
15.81
[9.7;18.8]
8.68
[n/a;14.9]
10.31
[0.3;13.7]
17.45
[13.6;19.8]
17.15
[14.1;19.2]

20.74
[15.7;23.6]
22.4
[18.9;24.7]
30.61
[28.3;32.4]
32.45
[30.5;34.0]
37.09
[35.1;38.7]
28.24
[26.6;29.6]
30.24
[28.5;31.7]
28.27
[26.5;29.7]
29.68
[27.9;31.1]
36.41
[34.5;38.0]
23.12
[20.5;25.0]
13.86
[n/a;18.7]
30.49
[28.4;32.2]
28.17
[25.9;29.9]
15.02
[n/a;20.8]
28.68
[26.4;30.4]
35.1
[33.3;36.6]

OR

1.99
[n/a;13.9]
14.9
[7.7;18.1]
12.33
[9.6;14.2]
18.18
[16.5;19.5]
22.3
[16.6;25.4]
17.99
[10.1;21.4]
15.89
[n/a;19.9]
11.27
[n/a;16.0]
17.89
[14.1;20.3]
21.77
[18.6;23.9]
14.89
[8.9;17.8]
16.87
[11.1;19.8]
12.69
[0.5;16.3]
12.71
[n/a;16.7]
15.69
[9.7;18.8]

26.9
[24.7;28.6]
17.88
[n/a;22.5]
11.26
[n/a;14.9]
24.24
[22.7;25.5]
34.66
[32.6;36.3]
33.1
[31.1;34.7]
28.01
[26.2;29.5]
30.14
[28.3;31.7]
25.85
[23.4;27.7]
21.16
[16.5;23.9]
24.42
[22.8;25.8]
29.62
[27.4;31.3]
23.1
[19.0;25.7]
33.47
[31.5;35.0]
26.95
[23.1;29.1]

16.54
[8.6;19.8]

29.31
[26.5;29.3]

AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA

ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK

PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
SNA
WNA

Note: n/a: IRR can not be calculated since the corresponding shadow value is negative. SNA: Simple
National Average. WNA: Weighted National Average*The bounds of the confidence intervals for the
National Averages are calculated as the average of the respective bounds for all states.
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Figure 3. Histogram of the own state IRR’s ( r ) - Model 2.
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Figure 4. Histogram of the social IRR’s ( r 1 ) - Model 2.
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Figure 5. Own state IRR’s to public agricultural R&D – Model 2

References: Red: r = 0-10% ;Yellow: r = 10-20%; Blue: r > 20%

Figure 6. Social IRR’s to public agricultural R&D expenditures – Model 2

References: Yellow: r = 10-20%; Blue: r = 20-30%; Orange: r > 30%
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Huffman et al. (2002), the only other study of this nature that is publically
available, obtain estimates for the Midwestern states. For comparison purposes we
calculate a simple average and a weighted average of our estimates for the states of
Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and Indiana. The simple and weighted average own
state IRRs for the Midwestern states, 18% and 17.32% 37 respectively, are higher than the
11% in their study. Our simple and weighted social IRR for the Midwestern states are
approximately 33% 38 figures that are lower than the “significantly higher than 40%”
reported in their paper. 39

5. Conclusions

The present study is an attempt at providing a quantitative assessment of the
returns to public agricultural R&D investments during the last five decades in the United
States. This is done first by deriving the returns to a local public good from a theoretical
model of firm behavior using the concept of virtual prices, then showing how to measure
them when no information is available on market rates of return. Our method explicitly
acknowledges for the spillover effects of these investments by incorporating them
structurally and stochastically in the model and by allowing endogenous derivation of
virtual prices, own and social. The objective is to use these estimates in calculating
marginal internal rates of return to the use of public monies on R&D investments in
agriculture. The study uses a data set of inputs and outputs developed by Craig, Pardey
and Acquaye for specific use in productivity analysis combined with R&D stocks built
37

The 95% confidence interval is [5.98%; 21.14%]
The 95% confidence interval is [31.21; 34.91].
39
Our estimates of the average elasticity of cost with respect to the stock of public R&D in these states is 5%, lower than the -87% estimated in their study.
38

36

following Evenson’s inverted-V lag structure. Discussions on the size of returns to R&D
investments in U.S. agriculture are even more important given the international food
crisis and in light of the proposed cuts in federal monies.
The own state internal rate of return we estimate is, on average for the nation,
17%. The social internal rate of return we estimate is, on average for the nation, 29%.
Knowledge spillovers are important in agriculture and an attempt at capturing all
information structurally and stochastically should be considered. After adjusting for
stochastic spatial effects, the returns to agricultural investments in R&D in the United
States have been impressive, although our estimates are lower than estimates for the
Midwest by Huffman. In this sense, this study provides evidence in support of Alston
and Pardey’s (2001) assertion that “improper attribution of locational spillovers generates
high and very variable estimates of the rate of return to agricultural research.”
Although not a primary focus of this analysis, our study has also found that in
aggregate U.S. agriculture, technical change induced by public agricultural R&D has
been biased towards the use of capital and purchased inputs and against the use of labor.
We also found evidence of potential long term impacts of public R&D investments on
long run growth of the sector. The capacity to generate growth endogenously and
perpetually through public investments in R&D makes this an important policy tool. This
is an even more important insight when faced with the alternative use of food crops for
biofuels and the implication for food prices and the federal government’s potential
reductions in budget for agricultural research and development.
A number of important shortcomings of this analysis should be mentioned. First,
we know of updated an improved aggregates, in particular for capital, being worked out

37

by Andersen, Alston and Pardey. Presumably these would be better to use in the analysis
but the data is not yet available for public use. Second, given the growing importance of
private investments in agricultural R&D we might err by attributing benefits to public
investments that might have been the result of private investments. We hope that the
quality adjustments included by Craig, Pardey and Acquaye in the painstaking job of
constructing the output and input indexes are enough to diminish the impact of this
potential flaw. We would expect that the appropriable benefits of private research are
embodied in the input aggregates used and therefore effectively captured in this study.
Similarly, the omission of the extension services, the stock of infrastructure and of
international spillovers might also render our estimates upward biased. Third, our
analysis is static, and assumes naïve expectation formation in production and decision
making, all these compromising our estimates.
All in all even if we provide estimates of the rate of return to public R&D in
agriculture lower than previously suggested, an average return of 29% on public funds is
still impressive compared to the 9% and 12% average returns of the S&P500 and
NASDAQ composite indexes during the same period.
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics.
Descriptive statistics of the variables pooled through time and states.
Variable
Output Quantity
Land Quantity
Labor Quantity
Capital Quantity
Purchased Inputs Quantity
Expenditures in
Land in 1949
Expenditures in
Labor in 1949
Expenditures in
Capital in 1949
Expenditures in
Purchased Inputs in 1949
Total Value of
Agricultural Output in 1949

Units
(1949=100)
(1949=100)
(1949=100)
(1949=100)
(1949=100)
$1,000
$1,000
$1,000
$1,000
$1,000

N
2064
2064
2064
2064
2064

Mean
145.51
84.56
59.49
121.47
179.36

Std Dev
55.88
20.34
21.22
33.32
85.60

Minimum
62.65
23.63
16.68
40.72
39.08

Maximum
418.68
122.88
100.99
302.30
562.24

48

132,515

116,648

2,119

529,117

48

303,343

217,003

11,909

931,771

48

177,403

143,910

8,546

526,525

48

140,533

115,487

8,641

534,242

48

620,240

566,447

21,858

2,399,574

Source: Acquaye, Alston, and Pardey (2003).
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis pooled through time and
states.
Variable
wM
wL
wK
SHM
SHL
SHK
T
y
G
S
c

Units
(1949=100)
(1949=100)
(1949=100)
Proportion of the Variable
Cost
Proportion of the Variable
Cost
Proportion of the Variable
Cost
$1,000
(constant 1949 dollars)
$1,000
(constant 1949 dollars)
$1,000
(constant 1949 dollars)
$1,000
(constant 1949 dollars)
$1,000
(constant 1949 dollars)

N
2064
2064
2064

Mean
201
446
207

Std Dev Minimum Maximum
117
94
593
328
95
1415
115
84
483

2064

0.3882

0.1182

0.1455

0.8195

2064

0.2810

0.0986

0.0623

0.6594

2064

0.3307

0.0651

0.1182

0.5300

2064

122,989

118897

587

532774

2064

920,314

905341

14694

5631427

2064

1,729

1943

99

16624

2064

7,649

5979

138

31426

2064

664,066

545272

10702

3183774

Sources: G and S are based on author’s calculations. All other variables are from
Acquaye, Alston, and Pardey (2003).
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Appendix 2. Model 1: Full model with no SAR error structure

Method of estimation: ITSUR
Parameters in the model: 174
Linear Restrictions: 55
Parameters Estimated: 119
Method: Gauss
Number of Iterations: 50
Final Convergence Criteria: CONVERGE=0.001 Criteria Met
Observations Processed: 2064
Equation

DF
Model

DF Error

R-Square

Adj. R-Sq.

AIC

ln c

83.11

1981

0.8084

0.8004

0.24942

SHM

17.94

2046

0.9376

0.9371

0.001031

17.94
SHK
System R-Square:

2046

0.8034

0.8017

0.000985

Parameter Estimates:
Parameter Estimate

0.896487

SE

T-value

Parameter

Estimate

SE

T-value

δT

1.661054

0.1796

9.25

βKY

-0.03839

0.00509

-7.54

δY

-1.03266

0.2336

-4.42

βTY

0.144139

0.0386

3.73

δG

0.439636

0.2601

1.69

βMG

0.009626

0.00415

2.32

βMK

0.067766

0.00568

11.93

βLG

-0.01025

0.00386

-2.65

βMT

-0.01813

0.00601

-3.02

βKG

0.000619

0.00377

0.16

βMY

0.124598

0.00561

22.21

βTG

0.014571

0.0281

0.52

βLK

0.037924

0.00415

9.14

βYG

-0.09133

0.0463

-1.97

βLT

0.068861

0.00575

11.98

βGS

-0.24097

0.021

-11.46

βLY

-0.08621

0.0052

-16.56

βML

0.081212

0.00325

24.98

βLL

-0.11914

0.00352

-33.87

βMS

0.034992

0.00415

8.43

βMM

-0.14898

0.00501

-29.71

βLS

-0.03773

0.00387

-9.75

βKK

-0.10569

0.00835

-12.66

βKS

0.002742

0.00388

0.71

βTT

-0.19386

0.0293

-6.62

βTS

-0.16861

0.0162

-10.39

βYY

-0.07296

0.0644

-1.13

βGG

0.31271

0.0374

8.35

-0.05074
0.00559
-9.07
0.239682
0.0181
13.25
βKT
βYS
Parameters estimates of dummy variables are not reported but could be obtained from the
authors.
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Appendix 3. Model 2. Full model with SAR error structure.

Method of estimation: ITSUR
Parameters in the model: 174
Linear Restrictions: 55
Parameters Estimated: 119
Method: Gauss
Number of Iterations: 41
Final Convergence Criteria: CONVERGE=0.001 Criteria Met
Observations Processed: 2064
Equation

DF
Model

DF
Error

R-Square

Adj.R-Sq.

AIC

ln c*

83.11

1981

0.9324

0.9296

0.06615

SHM*

17.94

2046

0.926

0.9254

0.000611

SHK*
17.94
System R-Square:

2046

0.8904

0.8895

0.000418

0.911236

* Transformed variables.
Parameter Estimate
1.007875
δT

SE
0.1101

T-value Parameter Estimate
9.15
-0.05499
βKY

SE

T-value

0.00384

-14.33

δY

-0.35228

0.1432

-2.46

βTY

-0.07576

0.0204

-3.71

δG

-0.40512

0.1617

-2.51

βMG

0.013477

0.00299

4.51

βMK

0.074332

0.00888

8.37

βLG

-0.01807

0.0026

-6.95

βMT

-0.03649

0.00736

-4.96

βKG

0.004589

0.0026

1.77

βMY

0.135337

0.00451

30.02

βTG

0.035987

0.0166

2.17

βLK

0.070494

0.00739

9.54

βYG

-0.04832

0.0268

-1.80

βLT

0.076869

0.00634

12.12

βGS

0.035599

0.0132

2.69

βLY

-0.08035

0.00378

-21.25

βML

0.058759

0.0058

10.14

βLL

-0.12925

0.0072

-17.95

βMS

0.040074

0.00347

11.54

βMM

-0.13309

0.00907

-14.68

βLS

-0.03284

0.00329

-9.99

βKK

-0.14483

0.0119

-12.20

βKS

-0.00724

0.00342

-2.12

βTT

0.03303

0.0156

2.12

βTS

-0.05169

0.0096

-5.39

βYY

0.161682

0.0351

4.61

βGG

0.039228

0.0207

1.89

-0.04038
0.00602
-6.70
0.020784
0.0104
2.00
βKT
βYS
The parameters corresponding to dummy variables are not reported but could be obtained
from the authors.
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